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THE NEW PHILOSOPHY AND ITS STYLE
by Dwight Van de Vate, Jr.
The absolute idealist movement in British philosophy began
 
with the publication of Hutchinson Stirling’s The Secret of Hegel
 in 1865. Bernard Bosanquet’s Gifford Lectures of 1911-1912 were
 its last major production. By the death of F. H. Bardley in 1924 the
 effective force of the movement had ended. Bradley was its most
 profound and original member and his Appearance and Reality
 its most influential book. A sample
 
passage:
And hence, for the present at least, we must
 believe that reality satisfies our whole being.
 Our main wants—for truth and life, and for
 beauty and goodness—must all find satisfaction.
 And we have seen that this consummation must
 somehow be experience, and be individual. Every
 element of the universe, sensation, feeling,
 thought, and will, must be included within one
 comprehensive sentience.1
1F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (2nd ed.; Oxford: Oxford Uni
­
versity Press, 1955), p. 140.
The style is grave, heightened, formal, suiting the subject—“the
 
Absolute.” It is impossible to think of Bradley telling a joke. He
 does not preach or edify, he states the truth and the reasons for it.
 His “we” refers to all who undertake the serious business of
 reasoning about the ultimate nature of the universe and human
 life.
After the Great War, the fashion changed. Idealism—in its
 
several senses—died at Ypres and the Somme. The generation that
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marched off to the trenches with the unaffected high spirits and
 
copy-book maxims of Lord Baden-Powell’s England returned—the
 few who did return—without illusions. To them the academic
 grandiosity of absolute idealism was synthetic and dishonest. If
 indeed “the utility of metaphysics is to be found in the comfort it
 can give us,"2 then metaphysics, they thought, must be irrelevant
 and cheap. It was time for a new philosophical fashion and for
 a new style of philosophical writing.
2J. E. McTaggart, Philosophical Studies, p. 184, quoted in G. J. Warnock,
English Philosophy since 
1900
 (London: Oxford University Press, 1958),
p. 5.
3Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Pen
­
guin Books, 1953), p. 46. The essay, “The Place of Science in a Liberal Edu
­cation,” from which this passage is taken was first published in 1913.
4Ibid., p. 34. The essay 
“
Mysticism and Logic,” from which this passage  
is taken was first published in 1914.
The leaders of the new fashion were Bertrand Russell, G. E.
 
Moore, and the Austrian, Ludwig Wittgenstein. No one has stated
 its basic theme better than Russell:
The kernel of the scientific outlook is a thing
 
so simple, so obvious, so seemingly trivial, that
 the mention of it may almost excite derision. The
 kernel of the scientific outlook is the refusal to
 regard our own desires, tastes, and interests as
 affording a key to the understanding of the
 world.3
The hope of satisfaction to our more human de
­
sires—the hope of demonstrating that the world
 has this or that desirable ethical characteristic—
 is not one which, so far as I can see, a scientific
 philosophy can do anything whatever to satisfy.4
 A technological war had occurred simultaneously with revolution
­ary advances in physical theory. The new philosophy therefore
 was founded on the conviction that it is the function of the scien
­tist alone to discover the facts. The philosopher’s concern is
 not for the facts themselves, but for the language in which they
 are stated. Scientists state the truth, philosophers analyze the mean
­ings of words. Philosophy became “analytic.”
The new analytic philosophy was dominated between the wars
 
by the symbolic logic movement which stemmed from Whitehead
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and Russell’
s
 Principia Mathematica of 1910-1913. This phase is  
called "Logical Positivism.” The logical positivists aimed to elimi
­nate metaphysics by devising symbolic calculi or artificial lan
­guages in which only scientifically meaningful propositions could be
 expressed. Driven from their hiding places in the imprecisions of
 ordinary language, metaphysical problems would thus be shown
 to be unreal “pseudo-problems.” The program’s most influential
 statement was Wittgenstein’s Tractates Logico-Philosophicus of
 1922.
Early in the 1930’s Wittgenstein rejected the logical positivists’
 
attempts (including his own) to impose a single standard of pre
­cision on language. He now regarded ordinary languages such as
 English or German not as pre-scientific approximations to logical
 calculi, but as instruments of a suppleness and subtlety adequate
 to the multifarious tasks for which humans use them. One elimi
­nates metaphysics, he now thought, not by escaping from ordinary
 language, but by using it correctly. The pseudo-problems of the
 metaphysician result from his misuses of ordinary idiom, from his
 failure to see the jobs words do. Hence the philosopher’s function
 is therapeutic: he shows those troubled by metaphysical perplex
­ities how their (pseudo-) problems come from using words in
 illegitimate ways. It 
is
 not necessary to invent artificial languages  
in which metaphysical propositions cannot be expressed. They can
­not be expressed grammatically even in ordinary language.
The impact of Wittgenstein’s new program of “ordinary lan
­
guage analysis” on the British philosophical public was gradual, but
 pervasive. He lectured from 1930 to 1947 at Cambridge; while he
 published almost nothing, his lectures were circulated in manu
­script. By the posthumous publication in 1953 of the definitive
 statement of his later philosophy, the Philosophical Investigations,
 his influence had come to dominate philosophy in Great Britain.
 There are signs that it may soon dominate philosophy in the
 United States as well.
The style of the new philosophy has been influenced more by
 
G. E. Moore than by Wittgenstein, who wrote in German. Moore
 
is
 a curiously “adverbial” figure: what he had to say was of less  
importance than the painstaking effort at clarity and logical rigor
 with which he said it. He was concerned to defend “common
 sense”—the plain man’s belief that there 
is
 an external world, that  
3
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he has a body, that there are other people, etc.—against what he
 
conceived to be the slipshod and precipitate arguments of the
 absolute idealists. But common sense is where philosophy begins,
 not where it ends. Moore’s position was negative: intentionally, he
 had nothing new to say. What was new was the ruthless sincerity
 and indefatigability of his effort to say exactly what he meant.
In this regard, one may single out three features of Moore’s
 
style: his addiction to italicization, his fondness for expostulatory
 phrases, and his use of the first-person-singular form of organiza
­tion. In the Principia Ethica (1903), a book of two hundred and
 thirty-one pages, there are eighteen pages where no italicized
 word occurs. This paragraph from the "Refutation of Idealism” il
­lustrates Moore’s use of italics:
Now I think I am not mistaken in asserting that
 
the reason why Idealists suppose that everything
 which is must be an inseparable aspect of some
 experience, 
is
 that they suppose some things, at  
least, to be inseparable aspects of their experience.
 And there is certainly nothing which they are so
 firmly convinced to be an inseparable aspect of
 their experience as what they call the content of
 their ideas and sensations. If, therefore, this turns
 out in every case, whether it be also the content
 or not, to be at least not an inseparable aspect of
 the experience of it, it will be readily admitted
 that nothing else which we experience ever is
 such an inseparable aspect. But if we never
 experience anything but what is not an insepara
­ble aspect of that experience, how can we infer
 that anything whatever, let alone everything, is
 an inseparable aspect of any experience? How
 utterly unfounded is the assumption that “esse
 is percipi” appears in the clearest light.5
The italics emphasize like blows of
 
a hammer.
5G. E. Moore, 
“
The Refutation of Idealism,” in W. Barrett and H. D.  
Aiken, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (New York: Random House,
 1962), p. 559.
4
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The tone of the paragraph 
is
 expostulatory: "there is certainly  
nothing of which they are so firmly convinced . . . ,” "nothing else
 which we experience ever 
is
 . . . ,” "how can we infer that anything  
whatever, let alone everything . . . "how utterly unfounded . . . "
 In each case, the emphasis is stronger than a simple statement of
 fact would require. Here are the first and last sentences of the
 same essay:
Modern Idealism, if it asserts any general con
­
clusion about the universe at all, asserts that it
 
is
 spiritual.6
6Ibid., p. 543.
7Ibid., p. 561.
8Ibid., pp. 545-546.
All other suppositions—the Agnostic’s, that some
­thing, at all events, does exist, as much as the
 Idealist’s, that spirit does—are, if we have no
 reason for believing in matter, as baseless as the
 grossest superstitions.7
The effect is intense indignation. One imagines Moore shaking his
 
head and striking the air
 
with his forefinger.
The object of this impassioned concern in the "Refutation of
 Idealism” was, on Moore’s own insistence, nothing much:
The subject of this paper 
is,
 therefore, quite  
uninteresting. Even if I prove my point, I shall
 have proved nothing about the Universe in gen
­eral. ... I shall only try to arrive at the truth
 about a matter, which 
is
 in itself quite trivial  
and insignificant, and from which, so far as I
 can see and certainly so far as I shall say, no
 conclusions can be drawn about any of the sub
­jects about which we most want to know ....
 [From my argument] it will indeed follow that
 all the most striking results of philosophy . . .
 have, for all that has hitherto been urged in their
 favour, no more foundation than the supposition
 that a chimera lives in the moon. It will follow
 that, unless new reasons never hitherto urged
 can be found, all the most important philosophic
 doctrines have as little claim to assent as the
 most superstitious beliefs of the lowest savages.8
5
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Here the reaction to Bradley and the Idealists 
is
 total. If they  
rescued the Good, the True, and the Beautiful—the Things that
 Matter—with a grubby unconcern for their own objectivity, Moore,
 on the contrary, will practise a pure logical punctiliousness, an
 impeccable argumentative rigor.
However, the plain man’s beliefs are not the conclusion of a
 
constructive argument, but the premiss of a destructive one. One
 does not arrive at Common Sense, one starts from it. Hence Moore’s
 logical conscientiousness had only a negative function. Common
 Sense will stolidly persist in the plain man s consciousness whether
 defended or not. Accordingly—and the conclusion is not meant
 pejoratively — Moore purchased rigor at the price of relevancy, just
 as he regarded the Idealists as doing the reverse. The practice of
 philosophy had an effect on Moore’s intellectual conscience, but
 not on his, or anyone’s, substantive beliefs. So a recent and sym
­pathetic commentator can write that "among the immediately
 operative factors contributing to the decay of Absolute Idealism,
 special notice should be paid to the character of Moore.”9
9Wamock, op. 
cit.,
 p. 12.
10G. E. Moore, “A Defence of Common Sense,” in Barrett and Aiken,
 op. 
cit.,
 p. 562.
It was character—in the intellectual sense—that Moore display
­
ed in his writings. He had not Russell’s limpid clarity or hilariously
 malicious wit. Character is personal. Arguing was an activity Moore
 personally undertook. His essays do not organize themselves, he
 organizes them, he "proposes to dispute,” he "wishes to show,” he
 will "prove his point” This first-person organization is sometimes
 belligerent:
I begin, then, with my list of truisms, every one
 
of which (in my own opinion) I know, with cer
­tainty, to
 
be true.10
Nothing dictated Moore’s defence of Common Sense but his per
­
sonal intellectual affront at the Idealists’ reasons for rejecting it
 Common Sense was placidly indifferent to both. Moore argued on
 his own initiative. Hence the first-person manner of organiza
­tion, and hence also the reiterated avowals: "I think,” ‘I mean,”
 “I believe,” "in my opinion.” Assaulting an orthodoxy in the name of
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a position it scorned as banal, that he himself thought banal, Moore
 
had constantly to affirm his sincerity. It was his keenest weapon.
Yesterday’s iconoclasm becomes today’s orthodoxy. This meta
­
morphosis has happend to Wittgenstein and Moore. The British
 philosophical community is far more intimate and monochromatic
 than the American: it nourishes one fashion at a time. If the
 doctrines of the new orthodoxy, ordinary language analysis, are
 Wittgenstein’s, the style descends from Moore—the frequent italic-
 ization, the first-person-singular organization. Moore
'
s indignant  
earnestness, however, has been replaced by a lightness of tone that
 becomes on occasion even playful:
People used to say this kind of thing prior to
 
Russell, and it had its merits. But it also had
 its defects, because it led people to ask peculiar
 questions, like whether Minerva and the class of
 voters could all get in through the door at the
 same time.11
11J. Jarvis, “
Notes
 on Strawson’s Logic,” Mind, LXX, no. 277 (January,  
1961), 65.
12Z. Vendler, “Each and Every, Any and All,” Mind, LXXI, no. 282 (April,
 
1962), 155.
18M. Zimmerman, 
“
The Is-Ought’: An Unnecessary Dualism,” Mind,  
LXXI, no. 281 (January, 1962), 53.
Having thus put myself way out on a limb, I
 
may expect the objection: “This 
is
 sheer sophis ­
try: what the sponsor said is true if every doctor
 agrees that Stopsneeze helps, otherwise it is
 false.
” 
12
Suppose we never break through the “is-ought”
 barrier, what then? Let us speculate. Then we
 can never justify ethics and morality. Well, per
­haps this would only be true for natura
­lists . . . 13
These examples are chosen as extreme. Most philosophical prose,
 
now as in Bradley's day, is formal. Today, however, even the most
 formal writing is not heightened, but logical, unemotional. Illus
­trations are chosen
 
from everyday life:
Thus suppose that I am riding across the west
­ern plains and notice intermittent clouds of 
7
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smoke rising from a hill to the right. ... I am
 
frightened of the Indians of whose presence, and
 interest, the smoke is a sign.14
14J. Gosling, "Mental Causes and Fear,” Mind, LXXI, 
no.
 283 (July,  
1962), 291-292.
15,D. Gallopp, "On Being Determined,” Mind, 
LXXI,
 no. 282 (April, 1962),  
193.
16E. H. Wolgast, "Qualities and Illusions,’’ Mind, LXXI, no. 284 (October,
 
1962), 470.
They are phrases like "the time at which the
 
letter was posted,” or "the amount of arsenic he
 put in her tea,” which are convertible into in
­direct questions... .15
If I buy a red hat, looking at it carefully in day
­
light, it will
 
be  red when I get home.16
There are occasional illustrations from physics, and from behavior
­
al psychology, to which a certain affinity is felt. (Mind, the lead
­ing British journal, encourages it.) The philosophy of mathematics,
 a legacy of Logical Positivism, is rapidly being abandoned, as
 the symbolic logicians themselves move into mathematics. The use
 of illustrations from history or literature is sparing to the point
 of exclusion. Contemporary political conflicts are ignored, in sharp
 contrast with Continental philosophy, which 
is
 dominated by them.  
The total absence of appeals, tacit or explicit, to any human in-
 erest but the urge for refined logical precision gives to this writing
 an air of drab severity, lightened here and there by strained
 whimsy.
Behind the sense of exactness imparted by italicization and
 
similar devices (quotation marks, numbered propositions), behind
 the resolutely "ordinary” illustrations, stands the unexpressed sup
­position that the price of precision is disengagement. The world
 enters into ordinary language analysis only through ordinary lan
­guage. The philosopher deals with the facts at second remove:
 with the language of ethics, not ethics, the language of religion,
 not religion, etc. He 
is
 detached, unemotional, save about lan ­
guage itself; there he can be affectionate:
It is crucial to an understanding of morality that
8
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this truth about the uses of our language be
 
understood.17
17K. Nielsen, “Some Remarks on the Independence of Morality from Re
­
ligion ” Mind, LXX, no. 278 (April, 1961), 186.
18P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books,
 
1954), p. 97.
Ordinary language, well used, is extremely flex
­
ible and precise; but the difference between its
 flexibility and precision and that of scientific
 language comes out in the fact that we never
 use the word 
'
nuance’ in the latter.18
Yet, curiously, his treatment of ordinary language is not scientific;
 he does not count the frequency of occurrence of words or com
­pare the grammars of different languages, and linguistic scientists
 have ignored him.
The effect of this abstractness on style is to be seen in the
 
first-person-singular form of organization. Wittgenstein found it
 fruitful to think of languages as games. This metaphor, with its
 suggestion of detachment, has become a standard idiom. The
 philosopher approaches his subject-matter unsolicited. No public
 necessity of science or politics or religion compels him to philos
­ophize. The commitments of a spokesman would impair his ob
­jectivity. His writings are organized 
as
 a display not of the in ­
telligibility of his topic, but of his own skill.
The philosophy of an era lives and maintains itself among shift
­
ing allegiances and animosities with science, religion, politics, and
 its own philosophical predecessors. This historical involvement
 creates doctrine, and doctrine will find a congenial style. The Log
­ical Positivism to which ordinary language analysis is a reaction
 was itself a reaction to the First World War. It aimed to be
 scientific: it scorned politics as propaganda, religion as dishonesty,
 morality as emotion. Now, in the decline of empire, the scientific
 ideal has been abandoned; philosophy is a twice-attenuated ghost.
 Style reflects this attenuation. Conceivably, the very gracelessness
 of today’
s
 philosophical writing may accelerate a doctrinal reac ­
tion. If accuracy need not be flat and laborious, if eloquence is
 authentic precision, then the ordinary language analysts may come
 in time to the recognition that their style implicitly traduces their
 own professed love, language, and reflects the fact that they have
 very little to say.
9
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